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Address
5F, 526 Nonhyeon-ro,
Gangnam-gu, Seoul, Korea
C&K Law Offices represented a blockchain company in a criminal complaint against an employee who held the recovery phrase (mnemonic) of the company’s operating wallets and moved company crypto assets without authorization. The police found grounds for computer fraud and breach of trust and referred the case to prosecutors. The matter shows how the loss amount should be identified and proven when an insider is behind a crypto asset leak.
The client is a blockchain company that manages its crypto assets through several operating wallets. The mnemonics for some of these wallets were held by a single employee. During an internal review, the company found that assets in those wallets had been sent to addresses it did not recognize.
Anyone holding a mnemonic can restore the wallet and move its assets. The company therefore concluded that the employee had transferred the assets without authority and decided to file a criminal complaint.
There were three issues. First, the company had to prove that the destination addresses were in fact controlled by the accused. Blockchain addresses do not show names, so the transaction flow had to be traced to link the addresses to a person.
Second, the scope of the loss had to be fixed. Some withdrawn assets returned to the company’s wallets within a few days, and claiming every withdrawal as a loss could have undermined the credibility of the whole complaint.
Third, the accused argued during the investigation that he had shared the mnemonic with others on the CEO’s instructions. If accepted, this would open the possibility that someone else moved the assets, so it had to be rebutted.
C&K Law Offices reorganized the wallet-by-wallet transaction records provided by the company and strengthened the link between the destination addresses and the accused. Transactions in which assets were withdrawn and later returned were excluded from the outset, and only withdrawals that never came back were set out in the schedule of offenses. We judged it more effective to focus on what investigators could accept without dispute, even at the cost of a smaller claimed amount.
In response to the claim that the mnemonic had been shared, we obtained internal communication records and submitted an opinion showing who was actually responsible for the mnemonic. Over the course of the investigation we filed five written opinions on behalf of the complainant and supplied the materials requested by the investigator each time.
The police referred the case to prosecutors on charges of computer fraud and breach of trust. At the prosecutors’ request for supplementary investigation, further steps followed, including a confrontation interview between the complainant’s side and the suspect.
At companies that manage crypto assets, mnemonics and private keys are often held by a small number of staff. In that structure, however, the records do not immediately show who moved the assets when a leak occurs, and investigations tend to drag on unless the victim company maps the transaction flow itself.
Preparing a clear record of wallet access rights, withdrawal times and recovery status from the complaint stage, and filtering out disputable amounts in advance, helps keep the investigation moving to the end.
If the employee accessed the wallet and made transfers without authority, computer fraud under Article 347-2 of the Criminal Act may apply. If the employee, in a position to manage company assets, breached that duty and caused the company a loss, occupational breach of trust (Articles 355(2) and 356) may also be considered. The charges depend on what authority the employee actually had.
There is no single rule. Including returned assets, however, makes it easy for the suspect to rebut the claim with transaction records, so it is safer to start with the portion that was never recovered.
The claim should be rebutted with internal records showing who held authority over the mnemonic and, if it was shared, when and with whom. Securing communication logs and role assignments early is important.
More on our work is available on our Criminal Defence page. For enquiries, contact us at contact@chakwon.com.
This article is based on the Korean Criminal Act (Act No. 22007, effective 2 October 2026). It is general information, not legal advice.