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5F, 526 Nonhyeon-ro,
Gangnam-gu, Seoul, Korea
Address
5F, 526 Nonhyeon-ro,
Gangnam-gu, Seoul, Korea
C&K Law Offices defended a client investigated for operating as an unreported virtual asset service provider after developing and providing an automated trading program that exploited price differences between virtual asset exchanges, and obtained a decision not to refer the case to prosecutors (no charge). The case is notable because what decided it was not the fact that the program was developed and provided but whether it was structured so as actually to handle users’ funds and virtual assets.
The client developed an automated trading program that trades on the price differences arising between exchanges and provided it to users. Users downloaded the program and connected it to their own exchange accounts.
Investigators, however, considered that providing the program amounted to the business of brokering, arranging or acting as agent for the sale or exchange of virtual assets. A virtual asset service provider must report to the Commissioner of the Korea Financial Intelligence Unit before starting business (Article 7(1) of the Act on Reporting and Using Specified Financial Transaction Information), and the investigation started from the allegation that the client had done business without this report. Conducting virtual asset business without reporting is punishable by imprisonment of up to five years or a fine of up to KRW 50 million (Article 17(1) of the same Act), so the case was far from minor for the client.
There were two main questions to examine in this case.
Whether the client directly received or held users’ funds or virtual assets.
Whether the client was directly involved in concluding sale contracts between users and their counterparties. Whether someone is a virtual asset service provider is determined by these two matters of substance, not by the name or appearance of the service.
C&K Law Offices judged that simply asserting that the client was not a virtual asset service provider would not persuade the investigators. Since they already viewed the provision of the program as brokerage or agency, the first step was to show with objective material how the program actually worked.
We therefore set out the program’s technical architecture first. We presented evidence that users linked their own exchange accounts and API keys and executed orders themselves, and that the program had no deposit or withdrawal permissions, only permissions to place orders, check balances and view trading history. In other words, users’ money and virtual assets moved only within their own exchange accounts from start to finish, and the structure did not allow the client to receive or move them.
Next, we applied the client’s conduct point by point to the criteria for brokerage, arrangement and agency set out in the Financial Services Commission’s reporting manual for virtual asset service providers, its official interpretations and Supreme Court case law. We considered that establishing the criteria first and explaining the facts against them would allow the investigators to decide on the same basis.
We also linked the case to the legislative purpose of the reporting regime. We explained that the regime is a mechanism to prevent money laundering and that a program not involved in the flow of users’ funds was far removed from that purpose. Finally, we showed, together with the circumstances in which the business began, that the client had not structured the business with the intention of avoiding the reporting obligation.
The investigators found that the client had neither directly received users’ funds or virtual assets nor been involved in concluding sale contracts, and concluded that the conduct could hardly be regarded as unreported virtual asset business. The case ended with a decision not to refer it to prosecutors (no charge).
Services that assist virtual asset trading, such as automated trading, signals and trading bots, are likely to keep growing. Not all of them will be assessed in the same way, however. The conclusion can differ depending on whether the service receives users’ funds directly, holds withdrawal permissions or takes fees per transaction.
Anyone operating a similar service should therefore have it reviewed for reporting obligations early in the business rather than after an investigation begins. If an investigation has already started, quickly organising and submitting service architecture diagrams, permission settings screens, terms of use and fee records is the starting point of the defence.
No. Receiving payment alone does not determine the outcome; the assessment also considers whether users’ funds or virtual assets are held or managed and whether the structure involves brokering or acting as agent for trades.
Questions often focus on how the program works, in whose account orders are executed, where users’ funds go and how fees are charged. Materials should be prepared in advance so that these questions can be answered consistently.
If there is a complainant, the complainant may file an objection, in which case the case is sent to the prosecutor. Also, if the business structure is later changed, whether it is subject to reporting must be reviewed again.
More on our work is available on our Criminal Defence page. For enquiries, contact us at contact@chakwon.com.